In the following essay I attempt to refute two, somewhat independent assertions:

A First, that if God could have chosen to create a world other than the one he did (or none at all), then that entails that God is mutable, which is false.

B Second, that God must create the world which is best, i.e., most in keeping with his nature, intelligence, goodness, and so on, and that there is only one such possible world.

These two assertions are sometimes put forward in support of two additional assertions:

C that this existing world is the only possible one

D that God had no other possible choice.

In point of fact, C and D each would follow from either A or B taken on its own, even if both together provide a stronger case. Together, all four of these assertions are sometimes made in support of certain predestinarian notions about God, his freedom, and the possibility of things being other than they are.

Let it be said from the beginning that my own convictions regarding the divine will and the ordering of the cosmos do fall out along lines that are in the tradition of Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Calvin. Nonetheless, I do not take these convictions to entail the kinds of assertions noted above--thus my desire to rescue that tradition from such conclusions sometimes foisted upon it.

Also let it be said that the assertions above give rise, I believe, to a serious theological objection--that the created cosmos exists necessarily and thus, in some sense, is not really contingent nor truly distinct from God. This objection, however, is not the focus of what follows.

[2] I will address the concerns expressed in A and B in reverse order, beginning with the contention that there is only one best possible world. If that is false, then it entails that God's creation of this world involved a choice among possible options, necessitating an explanation of how that could be without compromising divine immutability. If all of this can be adequately explained, then conclusions C and D can be abandoned.

[3] So, why should we think this is the only best possible world? Why might it not be the case that there are an infinite number of incompossible worlds that God might have created that would all be equally and supremely good, including not creating anything at all?

Let's begin with the supposition that God might not have created anything at all. If God is always all-knowing, all-sufficient, all-glorious, all-loving, all-good, having every perfection in himself by necessity apart from created things (i.e., the Creator-creature distinction), then there is nothing that the existence of created things could possibly give God as a reason for making them rather than not making them at all. That is not to say that there is no reason to make created things, but that any reason given could not possibly be any better than the reasons God already has within himself for not making anything at all.

Moreover, among the various created worlds that God could have made, is one and only one of those worlds really more desirable than all the rest? Take, for instance, the possible world that is in all respects precisely like this world, except that during breakfast this morning I chewed my cereal one more time than I did in the actual world. Suppose further that in this possible world, I chewed my cereal in such a way that breakfast took just as much time as in the actual world, with just as much energy expended, just as much wear and tear on my teeth and jaw, the cereal just as much crushed before swallowing, and in every other respect just as the actual world. What reason did God have in ordaining the course of events in the actual world as preferable to the course of events in this other possible world?

So far as I can see, there is none. Both worlds are equally desirable and we would need some pretty good reasons for thinking otherwise. And if that is correct, it easily follows that there are an infinite number of possible worlds each equally desirable in relation to one another, including the possible world in which God creates nothing at all. There is, then, no reason for God to prefer one world over another. All of the infinite number under consideration are equally possible and none is better than another. From God's standpoint, each possible world contains within it sufficient reason to explain why God would have created it.

[4] Now, does this imply that God's choosing to create one world rather than another (or not creating anything at all) involves some kind of mutability in God? I would say that it does not. There are two ways, that I can think of, that one might suppose that God's choice to create one world rather than another (or none at all) would involve a change in God's own Self:

E It might be supposed that the difference in what is created implies a difference in the exercise of God's creative power and thus, had God created something else or nothing at all, that God would have been different, thereby denying divine immutability.

F It might also be supposed that, even if there were no difference in God's creative power, there would be a difference in God's choice to create--in his will--and thus, had God created something else or nothing at all, that God would have been different, thereby denying divine immutability.

It is my contention that both of these suppositions are mistaken.

[5] With regard to E we need to think a little about the nature of change and relations. There are two ways in which a thing may undergo change: (a) real change/relation and (b) logical change/relation.

Take, for example, two of my nephews, Zack and Nate. Zack is the older of the two, but suppose his younger brother, Nate, had a growth spurt and becomes taller than Zack, while Zack remains the same height. The real change would take place in Nate, who grew, not Zack. But a logical change would take place with regard to Zack too--it would now be true of him that he is shorter than Nate, something that was not true of him before. But there was no real change in Zack (he didn't shrink, for instance).

Along with such changes come relations. The relation "is taller than" involves both Nate and Zack. With regard to Nate, in whom the real change would have taken place, it is a real relation. With regard to Zack, who would have undergone no real change, it is merely a logical relation.

Consider another example. You are walking along, you lose your balance, and fall, crashing to the ground. Presumably gravity pulls you to the ground. Thus there is a relation between you and the earth so that it is the case that "the earth pulls you to the ground". Though the earth is the subject here, the real change takes place in you, not the earth whose gravitational force remained constant throughout. Thus the relation is real from your standpoint, but only logical from the standpoint of the earth.

Now, it is my contention that something similar is the case with regard to God's creative power. God's creating things, creating this thing rather than another, or not creating anything at all, involves no real change in the exercise of God's creative power. The relation "x creates y" is a real relation from the standpoint of the thing created (which begins to be rather than not being--a real change), but is only a logical relation from the standpoint of the Creator, since God's creative power is always on, full-throttle (so to speak)--like gravity--since God is pure act (i.e., perfect, that is, his creative power is always all it can be, without ebb or flow). As the locus of change when you fall is you, not the earth or its gravity, so the locus of change when things are created is in the created things themselves, not God.

Thus, God's creative power would be exercised in precisely the same way in every possible world, no matter what that world is like and even if God chose not to create anything at all. The difference lies in what is created, that is, in what God chooses to create.

[6] That, then, brings us to the question of God's choice to create. Even if creation itself (the exercise of God's creative power) involves no change, regardless whatever God might have created (including nothing at all), it might appear that there is a difference in God's choice--his will--in terms of which possible world he elects or decrees, and thus God would have to be subject to change.

Again, this is, I think, a misunderstanding. First, the supposed difference in God could not be analyzed in terms of a difference between "God electing among possible worlds" or not, since no matter what, it is true that "God elects," even if he creates nothing at all (since that is one of the possible worlds among those electable).

Second, the supposed difference in God could not be analyzed in terms of a difference between "God choosing to exercise his creative power" or not, since no matter what, God's creative power is always fully exercised.

Third, recall, that there is no reason for God to prefer one possible world over another, including the world in which he creates nothing at all. Every possible world is equally desirable. If that is so, then there simply is no logical space for God to make a choice in terms of preferring one world over another. So the supposed difference in God could not be analyzed in terms of a difference in his preferences, which are precisely the same whatever possible world he elects.

Wherein, then, does the difference lie? I would reply that the difference lies in what is created, not in God. Had God elected to create a world other than this one, or none at all, the "otherness" of this choice would not lie in some difference in God, but entirely in a difference of what came to exist, if anything. Likewise, had I thought of something this moment other than what I am actually thinking, the difference in the thought would not lie in any difference in me the moment before the thought (or some such), but entirely in a difference of what I would now be thinking.

[7] I think I have shown, therefore, that it is perfectly coherent to suppose that there are many different possible worlds that God might have chosen, but didn't, and that such a view supposes no mutability on the part of God. Thus none of the points above, A through F are, from my perspective, particularly persuasive and there are, I think, good ways to counter each one.

The assertion I made at the end of [6], I suspect, points us towards a further discussion regarding how we are to think about the will, human and divine freedom, the relationship between "choice" and one's "nature," and so on. I, for one, would not appeal to the "nature" of a person (traditionally conceived) as having quite the decisive a role in the choices we make (as it does for, say, Jonathan Edwards). But that topic is best left, I think, for another time.