The contours of Reformed covenantal theology are a matter of some debate and confusion today in Reformed circles. In this essay I will outline what I understand to be the general outlines of that covenant theology as it has been classically expounded by many of its major proponents and as we find it in the confessional Standards of my own Presbyterian tradition. I've tried to keep the main body of the text relatively simple, giving attention only to representative figures and broad outlines. Further elaboration can be found in the footnotes for those interested.

While some today many speak of "reshaping" covenant theology, I am only happy with such reshaping if it is a matter of knocking things back into shape in light of recent deviations or if it involves softening off the occasional rough edge or infelicitous turn of phrase that has cropped up in the history of the tradition. With regard to the substance of classically Reformed covenant theology, I have no quarrel, even if I believe the tradition is open to development along its established tajectories.

One topic of discussion is with regard to the nature of the pre-lapsarian "covenant of works" with Adam as the representative of humanity, as well as the relation of that covenant to (and its distinction from) the post-lapsarian "covenant of grace." In particular, there have been concerns expressed over [a] seeing the covenant of works as gracious and [b] denying that the covenant of works is (strictly) meritorious. Moreover, some have suggested that giving way to either [a] or [b] slides us quickly into some kind of undifferentiated "mono-covenantalism."¹

It seems to me that these concerns are misplaced and lack historical perspective. A very common teaching of the Reformed tradition, rooted in Scripture, is that the covenant of works is both gracious and non-meritorious (at least with regard to any notion of strict merit).

These aspects of Reformed theology were not often seen as a problem or with suspicion until quite recently and, then, only in response to certain distortions (Barthianism, some aspects of Norman Shepherd's teaching) and under the influence of Meredith Kline (who himself has, in some respects, moved away from the bulk of the Reformed tradition).²

In reacting to distortions of the sort we find, for example, in Barthianism, we need to exercise restraint so that we don't run headlong into the opposite extreme in over-reaction (nor miss out on any of the genuine insights that Barth may have offered). Part of that restraint will involve returning to Scripture and examining the teaching of Scripture in light of the historic Reformed faith. Unfortunately, I cannot presently undertake that task here, except in the barest sketch.

What I will do in the following is to provide a brief defense of the notion that, historically, many Reformed have taught that the covenant of works is both gracious and non-meritorious. I will also make a few gestures toward the wider basis for that teaching, biblically and theologically. Finally, I'll suggest why I don't think that such teaching blurs the substantive distinction between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace.

The Covenant of Works as Gracious

First, it should be noted that the term "grace" is not entirely univocal, but analogical. In contemporary Reformed thought, for instance, we often distinguish between "common grace" and "saving grace" or among the various "graces" that constitute salvation.

When we speak of the (saving) grace we find in Christ by which sinners are brought to salvation, we do not mean the same thing as the (common) grace God shows generally to his fallen creatures, even if we see that latter grace also as flowing from the cross of Christ. Yet there are analogies between these various uses of the term "grace" in that they all involve unmerited favor.

As fallen creatures, of course, our experience of God as gracious is always from the standpoint of human, sinful demerit before a just and holy God who, nonetheless, shows mercy and favor towards us. The question at hand is whether or not God's favor and goodness toward humanity in creation, prior to the fall, can also be understood in terms of "grace."

Such a use of the term "grace" would be a matter of analogically extending our understanding of grace from the perspective of fallen sinners to our pre-lapsarian condition under the covenant of works. But, with regard to analogical concepts, the epistemological order by which we come to know God as gracious does not necessarily follow the ontological order of grace itself, if creational grace is prior. It would be difficult, therefore, to argue that the notion of grace apart from the fall is, in principle, an incoherent notion so long at the term is understood analogically.

Second, Reformed divines have typically seen the covenant of works as gracious with regard to: [a] its establishment with humanity (whether that is held to have occurred in the act of creation or subsequently), [b] its promised reward (whether that is seen in terms of elevation to eschatological life or confirmation in the blessed condition already enjoyed), and [c] the gifts, abilities, and dispositions granted to Adam whereby he might have kept the covenant. These elements of grace were not always distinguished precisely as I have here, but the witness to them in traditional Reformed covenant theology is clear and pervasive.³

What follows is merely a representative selection of Reformed witnesses to the graciousness of the covenant of works. It is by no means exhaustive. I've chosen sources from England, Scotland, the Continent, and American, from each of the centuries from the 16th until the 19th. For more detailed documentation, see the footnotes and the studies listed at the end under "Further Resources."

One of the earliest Reformed documents to speak of the "grace" in which Adam stood prior to the fall is the French Reformed La confession de foi (or Gallic Confession) in which we read, "We believe that man was created pure and perfect in the image of God and that by his own guilt he fell from the grace which he received..." (Article 9). This confession was first penned by Calvin, revised and expanded by his student, Antoine de la Roche Chandieu, and adopted in 1559 in Paris by the first National Synod of the Reformed Church of France.⁴

Moving from France, we can consider the posthumously published A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace by English Presbyterian John Ball (1585-1640), which went to press in 1645 during the Westminster Assembly. Ball states with regard to God's covenant with Adam:

The Covenant is of God, and that of his free grace and love: for although in some Covenant the good covenanted be promised in justice, and given in justice for our works: yet it was of grace that God was pleased to bind himself to his creature, and above the desert of the creature: and though the reward be of justice, it is also of favour. For after perfect obedience, performed according to the will of God, it had been no injustice in God, as he made the creature of nothing, so to have brought him unto nothing: it was then of grace that he was pleased to make that promise, and of the same grace his happiness should have been continued.⁵

Turning to Scotland, according to the Scots theologian and preacher, Hugh Binning (1627-1653), in the covenant of works,

there were some outbreakings of the glorious grace and free condescendency of God; for it was no less free grace and undeserved favour to promise life to his obedience, than now to promise life to our faith. So that if the Lord had continued that covenant with us, we ought to have called it grace, and would have been saved by grace as well as now (The Common Principles of the Christian Religion, Lecture VI).⁶

As a representative of Continental Reformed scholasticism, we can consider Geneva divine, Francis Turretin (1623-1687). In the midst of his discussion of the covenant of nature made with Adam, he states that "with respect to God, it was gratuitous, as depending upon a pact or gratuitous promise (by which God was not bound to man, but to himself and to his own goodness, fidelity, and truth)" (Institutes 8.3.16).⁷ Turretin, as with other Reformed divines, roots any notion of "binding" or "desert" not in any absolute obligation of God to man, but in God's faithfulness to himself and his promises. Moreover, this gratuitous covenant operates in the context of God's grace in creation and the gifts of grace that he had bestowed upon Adam (see footnote).

Among 18th century Scots Presbyterians James Fisher (1697-1775) is well known for his text, The Assembly's Shorter Catechism Explained, more popularly known as Fisher's Catechism.⁸ In it he writes, regarding the covenant of works as discussed in Question 12 of the Westminster Shorter Catechism:

Q. 33. What then was the grace and condescension of God that shined in the covenant of works?

A. In that he entered into a covenant, at all, with his own creature; and promised eternal life as a reward of his work, though he had nothing to work with, but what he received from God, 1 Cor. 4:7.

Similarly, in his 1869 Commentary on the Westminster Confession of Faith (Chapter 7), American theologian A.A. Hodge (1823-1886)--a professor at Princeton Seminary and son of Charles Hodge--states, that while God's covenant with Adam "was a covenant of works and of law with respect to its demands and conditions," it was "also in its essence a covenant of grace, in that it graciously promised life in the society of God as the freely-granted reward of an obedience already unconditionally due." He grounds his understanding on the claim that "Creation itself, being a signal act of grace, cannot endow the beneficiary with a claim for more grace." Hodge makes similar remarks in his other writings.⁹

Explicit descriptions of the covenant of works in terms of divine grace are to be found in Reformed divines ranging from the 16th to the 20th centuries and as diverse as Zacharias Ursinus, William Bucanus, Francis Junius, Anthony Burgess, Patrick Gillespie, Thomas Blake, John Owen, Samuel Rutherford, William Bridge, Thomas Boston, John Brown of Haddington, Thomas Ridgeley, J. H. Thornwell, Robert L. Dabney, and Herman Bavinck. Many other Reformed theologians, while not employing the explicit language of "grace" nonetheless speak of the covenant of works as "voluntary condescension," God's "free gift," unmerited divine "favor," and so on.¹⁰

Third, while some might plead that the term "grace" needs to be reserved for God's favor shown to sinners in the face of demerit, such pleading seems unwarranted in light of the analogical function of language, given the historic understanding of Reformed theology, and in virtue of Scripture's own willingness to speak of grace analogically and apart from sin (e.g., Luke 1:30; 2:52; Acts 2:47; Philippians 2:9).

The analogical concept of "grace" involved here, though not unrelated to divine "goodness" or "beneficence," nonetheless goes beyond those attributes and is, instead, rooted in the absolute distinction between Creator and creature in which God stands in no need of the creature to whom he owes nothing. From the perspective of the creature, the creature can make no demands upon God and, even if God makes promises to the creature, such promises bind God to himself as faithful, rather than to the creature over against the Creator. To purge the covenant of works of all "outbreakings of grace" would seem to set up a sphere of creaturely autonomy that is in tension with the basic tenets of Reformed theology.

Now that we have a sketch in hand of the mainstream Reformed understanding of the covenant of works as gracious, we can go on to discuss the relation of merit to the covenant of works.

The Covenant of Works as Non-Meritorious

The question here involves the nature of Adam's obedience to God under the covenant of works and its relation to the promised reward that would have been recieved, had Adam obeyed. This, in turn, raises further questions, in particular, whether obedience and disobedience ought to be regarded as strictly symmetrical (merit vs. demerit) and the implications of Adamic obedience for how we conceive of Christ's obedience and his merits. I'll touch on each of these in turn.

First, in light of the grace woven into the covenant of works, Reformed theologians have generally maintained that the reward that Adam would have received had he obeyed cannot be spoken of as "merited." Some divines denied that the concept of merit could be applied at all, while others allowed that the notion of merit could be used, but only in an "improper" and "broad" sense.

With regard to the general concept of merit, a Puritan as eminent as William Perkins (1558-1602) could write in his 1597 treatise, A Reformed Catholike, "We renounce all personal merits, that is, all merits within the person of any mere man." Moreover, he continues, "we renounce all merit of works, that is, all merit of any work done by any mere man whatsoever." Perkins goes on to specifically apply this to the pre-lapsarian Adam under the covenant of works, denying that Adam's "continual and perfect obedience" would have merited anything from God.¹⁰

Returning to a theologian we considered earlier, the previous quotation John Ball indicates that merit is not his concern. In addition, he writes about Adam under the covenant of works

In this state and condition Adam's obedience should have been rewarded in justice, but he could not have merited that reward. Happiness should have been conferred upon him, or continued unto him for his works, but they had not deserved the continuance thereof: for it is impossible the creature should merit of the Creator, because when he hath done all that he can, he is an unprofitable servant, he hath done but his duty. (A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace)

Turning to Geneva divine, Francis Turretin, while he does use the term "merit" he explicitly roots that in patristic usage--the grace-imbued sense of "merit" intended by Augustine when he says that "God crowns his own gifts." In this broad and improper sense of "merit" Turretin suggests that even our present works as Christians, as the fruit and evidence of faith, are meritorious with regard to the reward that they will receive (Institutes 17.5.5).

This usage must be kept in mind when Turretin writes, "Adam himself, if he had persevered, would not have merited life in strict justice, although (through a certain condescension) God promised him by a covenant life under the condition of perfect obedience (which is called meritorious from that covenant in a broader sense...)" (Institutes 17.5.7).

He also writes, "There was no debt (properly so called) from which man could derive a right, but only a debt of fidelity, arising out of the promise by which God demonstrated his infallible and immutable constancy and trust." Thus while there's a sense in which, had Adam obeyed, God would have "owed" Adam his reward, this is not conceived by Turretin in term of a debt to Adam, but in virtue of God's own faithfulness to his divine promise.

Still, Turretin maintains that Adam's entire ability to obey God and thereby receive what was promised was a matter of grace and that Adam possessed sufficient grace to obey. Moreover, he says that "merit" in the proper sense only refers to "strict merit" and that is entirely excluded in all relations between God and his creatures. Turretin and others will sometimes speak in terms of "strict justice," but in saying this they are referring the fact that the covenant of works does not, in itself, make any room for pardon and mercy if violated.

If Turretin allows that covenant merit is only a broad and improper use of the term, then surely it is a use of the term we can live without and still formulate theology appropriately, as many Reformed theologians have done.

Again turning to James Fisher, we find the following series of questions and answers in his Catechism:

Q. 30. Was there any proportion between Adam's obedience, though sinless, and the life that was promised?

A. There can be no proportion between the obedience of a finite creature, however perfect, and the enjoyment of the infinite God, Job 22:2, 3 -- "Can a man be profitable to God? Is it any pleasure to the Almighty, that thou art righteous? or, is it gain to him, that thou makest thy way perfect?"

Q. 31. Why could not Adam's perfect obedience be meritorious of eternal life?

A. Because perfect obedience was no more than what he was bound to, by virtue of his natural dependence on God, as a reasonable creature made after his image.

Q. 32. Could he have claimed the reward as a debt, in case he had continued in his obedience?

A. He could have claimed it only as a pactional debt, in virtue of the covenant promise, by which God became debtor to his own faithfulness, but not in virtue of any intrinsic merit of his obedience, Luke 17:10.

As with the issue of grace, similar quotations could be multiplied from a variety of Reformed theologians over time and in a variety places, including Robert Rollock, William Ames, Patrick Gillespie, Johannes Cocceius, Herman Witsius, and many others.¹²

Second, we need to think about the relationship between obedience and disobedience with regard to the covenant of works. One might object that if Adam's receiving his promised reward by means of obedience would have involved no merit on his part, then, by analogy, his disobedience would not have involved demerit. Or, to put it another way, if Adam's obedience would not have strictly deserved reward, then why would his disobedience have strictly deserved punishment?

This line of reasoning, however, supposes a symmetry between merit and demerit that cannot stand in the face of the distinction between Creator and creature. As creatures whose relationship to God as Lord is one of complete dependence for all we are and have, we owe complete and perfect obedience to God as a reflex of our relationship to him of dependence, trust, sonship, and life. If, in Adam, we had maintained that obedience, then there would have been no room for boasting since our whole ability to obey was itself a gift of divine grace and the reward given to that obedience would have been graciously disproportionate to the homage rendered.

On the other hand, this relationship of dependence of the creature upon the Creator renders disobedience an act of utter unbelief, ingratitude, betrayal, and rebellion--all the more so in light of the grace already lavished upon us in Adam. Such disobedience on our part is, therefore, most deserving of its consequences and can rightly be described in terms of demerit before the bar of divine justice.

Thus William Ames writes, "In this covenant [of works] the moral deed of the intelligent creature lead either to happiness as a reward or to unhappiness as a punishment. The latter is deserved; the former is not" (The Marrow of Theology, 1.10.11).

Third, even if we do not conceive of Adam's receiving a reward for his obedience in terms of merit, this has no direct bearing upon the nature of Christ's obedience and its value to us for salvation, for Christ was no mere man, but the Son of God incarnate. Thus his obedience to his Father unto the death of the cross possessed infinite intrinsic worth and can rightly be spoken of in terms of its "merits" for us, even apart from insisting that Christ strictly merited his reward with regard to himself.

And here we reach the broader question of the relationship and distinction between the covenant of works with Adam and the covenant of grace with us in Christ. We are now in a position to apply some of this discussion to the relationship between the covenant of works and the covenant of grace.

The Covenants of Works and of Grace

I'll begin this discussion by considering the opposition between "bi-covenantalism" and "mono-covenantalism." Then I'll turn to the question of how we name and speak of the covenant of works. I will conclude with a discussion of similarities and differences between the two covenants.

First, it is sometimes the case in current discussions that we find a "bi-covenantal" scheme opposed to a "mono-covenantal" one. I suppose, in certain contexts, such language can be helpful. But it seems to me that the way in which it is often deployed is not particularly helpful, but supposes a relationship between the covenant of works and covenant of grace that is purely contrastive and equivocal, rather than following the more traditional path of delineating those respects in which the two covenants agree and those respects in which they differ (see, e.g., the discussion of Turretin, Institutes 12.4).

Such a way of delineating the relationship between the two covenants does not suppose that we must find a contrast at every point, but allows for various points of contact and continuity, thus establishing the relationship between the two covenants as analogical: involving similarities, even in a context of substantive differences, differences that establish a distinction between covenants not only in degree and accidental features, but in kind and substance.

Even the most ardent of "bi-covenantalists," however, usually (and rightly) see the covenant of grace as functioning within the wider context of the covenant of works, insofar as the covenant of grace involves Christ bringing the covenant of works to its intended fulfillment on our behalf, obeying where Adam rebelled. Thus, even on such a view, the connections between the two covenantal administrations are intrinsic and internal, even if the covenant of grace involves an intensification and elevation of grace in the context of sin and demerit by means of Christ's fulfilling of the covenant of works outside of us and for us.

Moreover, since both covenants reveal the one and the same God in his relationship to those creatures who bear his image, establishing the means by which they might be brought to their eschatological end, we would also expect a certain analogy or homology between these covenants, even if in application and outworking there are differences as to the character and nature of the two covenants.

Thus, I would suggest, a simplistic opposition of "bi-coventalism" against "mono-covenantalism" is inadequate and potentially misleading for the purposes of describing various approaches to covenant theology. Both positions, taken to an extreme, become problematic. Kline and Shepherd come to mind here, each gravitating towards a respective extreme, often in a manner that is reactionary against the opposite tendency.

Second, some have objected to the terminology that designates the pre-lapsarian covenant with Adam as a "covenant of works" (others, of course, object to the notion of a covenant with Adam altogether, but that's a different argument and I'll not address it here). This objection (though raised even by some in the 17th century) is often rooted in an abstract opposition between "works" and "grace" or the supposition that a "works" principle must necessarily involve a principle of merit.

Historically, however, as we have seen, this is not the case, since the covenant of works has been typically seen in terms of grace, while merit is denied. The biblical opposition between "works" and "grace" is one that is operative from the standpoint of sin and human demerit where, apart from grace and the gift of faith without which no one can please God, even our best works are tainted with sin, are unacceptable to God, and merit the just wages of death. But this is not the situation prior to Adam's fall into sin and thus not applicable in the context of the covenant of works.

Moreover, the terminology of "works" is applied retrospectively and by way of eminence from the viewpoint of the covenant of grace. In the words of Hugh Binning that I quoted earlier, "if the Lord had continued that covenant [of works] with us, we ought to have called it grace, and would have been saved by grace as well as now" (The Common Principles of the Christian Religion). Patrick Gillespie expresses a similar viewpoint in his 1661 The Ark of the Testament Opened when he writes,

The moving cause in both [covenants] was mere Grace, although the last has the honour by way of eminency to be styled the Covenant of Grace (whereof in its place) yet even the Covenant of Works (howsoever the condition of it was obedience, and the reward of it was to works), even that Covenant was thus far a Covenant of Grace.

It should also be kept in mind that "covenant of works" is not the only terminology historically used to describe God's original covenant with Adam. The covenant is also sometimes called a "covenant of life" (e.g., Westminster Catechisms; James Fisher) in virtue of the promised reward of eschatological life. It is sometimes called a "covenant of friendship" or "love" (e.g., Robert Rollock, William Strong, Fisher), referring to humanity's original relation to God in innocency in contrast with a covenant of "mercy" or "reconciliation" in light of human sin and corruption. It is quite often called a "covenant of nature" or "creation" (e.g., Rollock, James Cameron, Turretin) as it is rooted in God's relationship with humankind as originally created and graced with our original and natural integrity, gifts, and abilities.

Nonetheless, the terminology of "works" and "grace" came to prevail in discussions of Reformed covenant theology, though never to the complete exclusion of other terms. And I am happy enough to retain the traditional terms, so long as proper qualifications are made and possible misunderstandings are headed off.

Third, though the respects in which the covenants of works and of grace differ mark them out as fundamentally distinct, there are, nonetheless, various important respects in which the two covenants agree. The very same elements (grace, faith, works) can function both as points of difference as well as agreement, within their disparate contexts, relations, and so on.

The primary points of agreement and difference between the covenants of works and of grace can be outlined in the following fashion:

[1] The covenants agree insofar as the author of both is the Triune God who, as our Creator, has the sole authority to establish his creatures in covenant with himself. They differ insofar as in the covenant of works, God is the author in relation to us as Creator, while in the covenant of grace, God is the author in relation to us as Redeemer as well as Creator.

[2] The covenants agree insofar as the moving cause of both is the undeserved grace and favor of God as an overflow of divine love and benevolence. They differ insofar as in the covenant of works, the grace involved is that initial grace shown to innocent creatures in bringing them into existence with their gifts and abilities and a promise of reward, while in the covenant of grace, the grace involved is that superabundant grace upon grace shown to miserable sinners in rescuing them from corruption and death and bringing them to glory.

[3] The covenants agree insofar as the parties to the covenants are God and humanity, in the person of a federal head. The covenants differ insofar as the covenant of works was made in friendship with Adam as a human being and with his natural posterity in Adam as their federal head, while the covenant of grace was made in reconciliation in Jesus Christ as God incarnate and with his spiritual posterity in Christ, not only as their federal head, but also as their Mediator.

[4] The covenants agree insofar as they both promise eschatological life to humanity, in which they might more deeply participate in God as their blessedness and fruition. The covenants differ insofar as in the covenant of works, only this eschatological life was promised as a perfection and maturation of the state humanity already possessed, while in the covenant of grace salvation unto eschatological life was promised as a deliverance from sin, corruption, and death.

[5] The covenants agree insofar as the form of both required a fulfillment and restipulation of the covenant in order that it might be brought to fruition. The covenants differ insofar as the covenant of works was promised to humanity's own faithful obedience in virtue of the sufficient graces given to human nature, while the covenant of grace was promised to Christ and his faithful obedience on behalf of his people and received by them through faith.

[6] The covenants agree insofar as they both require that their promises be receieved in faith in order to enjoy their rewards. The covenants differ insofar as in the covenant of works, humanity possessed the grace of faith as part of our inherent righteousness in the natural and innocent relation of the human creature to God, who was trusted upon as Creator, while in the covenant of grace faith is exercised in the context of unbelief and terror as the means of receiving Christ's righteousness and as a new gift granted by God, who is trusted upon not only as Creator, but also as Redeemer (see, e.g., John Ball, A Treatise of the Covenant of Grace, Chapter 2, question 2; Turretin, Institutes 8.2 and 12.4.7).

[7] The covenants agree insofar as they both require that faith produce loving obedience as its fruit and evidence. The covenants differ insofar as in the covenant of works, the covenant promise was made to the faith and obedience that was part of the inherent righteousness of humanity as created and as an antecedent condition for the reception of eschatological life, while in the covenant of grace the covenant promise is made only to a faith that rests upon and receives the righteousness of Christ apart from any inherent righteousness and as a consequent condition that is the fruit and effect of the eschatological life already received in Christ.

[8] The covenants agree insofar as the final end of the covenants is to bring glory to God through the eschatological enjoyment of God by his creatures. The covenants differ insofar as the covenant of works would have brought glory to God in manifesting his initial favor and strict justice in terms of faithfulness to his original promise with no room for repentance or pardon, while the covenant of grace brings glory fo God in manifesting his exceedingly great love and merciful justice in terms of his faithfulness to a new promise, bringing salvation to sinners even at cost to himself.

These observations sum up some of the primary points of agreement and difference between the two covenants. Of course, there are further obvious differences between the two covenants (differing times of institution, differing extents of application, differing modes of manifestation, etc.), but I'm not going to outline those in detail.

Hopefully this discussion has clarified the nature of the covenant of works as that has been historically confessed by the bulk of the Reformed tradition. God's original covenant with Adam was both gracious and non-meritorious and yet, for all of that, this does not in any way confuse that covenant with the subsequent covenant of grace nor ignore their important differences nor eliminate Christ's necessary and faithful obedience in meriting salvation on our behalf.

Further Resources

Nothing beats going back to the original materials from the 16th and 17th centuries, but unless you have access to a solid theological library, that task will be difficult. Nevertheless, in recent years a great deal of scholarship has been done on the historical development of covenantal theology (also sometimes called "federal theology," though that usually refers to a particular way of doing covenantal theology). Below is a list of some helpful resources, addressing both historical and contemporary questions:

Bierma, Lyle D., "Law and Grace in Ursinus' Doctrine of the Natural Covenant: A Reappraisal" in Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, ed. by C. Trueman and R.S. Clark (Paternoster Press, 1999) 96-110.

Bolt, John, ed., "Covenant Tradition in Reformed Theology," a special edition of Calvin Theological Journal 29 (April 1994).

Gallant, Tim, "Monocovenantalism? Multiple Covenants, No Adamic Merit" at his Biblical Studies Center (May 16, 2004).

Letham, Robert W., "The Foedus Operum: Some Factors Accounting for Its Development" in Sixteenth Century Journal 14:4 (Winter 1983) 457-467.

McGiffert, Michael, "From Moses to Adam: The Making of the Covenant of Works" in Sixteenth Century Journal 19:2 (Spring 1988) 131-155.

-----, "Grace and Works: The Rise and Division of Covenant Divinity in Elizabethan Puritanism" in Harvard Theological Review 75 (October 1982) 463-502.

McGowan, Andrew T.B., "Federal Theology as a Theology of Grace" in Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology 2 (1984) 41-50.

McWilliams, David B., "The Covenant Theology of the Westminster Confession of Faith and Recent Criticism" in Westminster Theological Journal 53:1 (Spring 1991) 109-124.

Strehle, Stephen, Calvinism, Federalism, and Scholasticism: A Study of the Reformed Doctrine of Covenant (Peter Lang, 1988).

Torrance, Thomas F., Scottish Theology: From John Knox to John McLeod Campbell (T&T Clark, 1996).

Wallace, Peter J., "Covenant and Inheritance," transcript of a lecture given at Westminster Theological Seminary (October 15, 2003).

-----, "The Doctrine of the Covenant in the Elenctic Theology of Francis Turretin," unpublished paper (1994).

Ward, Rowland S., God and Adam: Reformed Theology and the Creation Covenant (New Melbourne Press, 2003).

I welcome any further interaction and comments on these topics. While my concern here has been largely historical, I also want to discern how best to formulate these issues in light of contemporary questions and to further theological development and understanding of both Scripture and the Reformed tradition.

Notes

1. These are some of the most controverted issues at present within Reformed covenant theology, though I find the polemical polarization rather odd from a historical perspective since there has always been a peaceable diversity with regard to matters of detail in covenant theology so long as the general outlines were retained. Some of that diversity will become more clear below.

On the particular issue of grace and merit, literature tending toward a non-gracious, meritorious covenant of works, emphasizing its differences from the covenant of grace, includes:

Lee Irons, "Redefining Merit: An Examination of Medieval Presuppositions in Covenant Theology" in Creator, Redeemer, Consummator: A Festschrift for Meredith G. Kline, eds. Howard Griffith and John R. Muether (Greenville, SC: Reformed Academic Press/Reformed Theological Seminary, 2000) 253-69.

Mark W. Karlberg, "Moses And Christ - The Place Of Law in Seventeenth-Century Puritanism" in Trinity Journal 10:1 (Spring 1989) 11-48.

-----, "Reformed Interpretation of the Mosaic Covenant" in Westminster Theological Journal 43:1 (Fall 1980) 1-57.

Meredith Kline, Kingdom Prologue, Genesis Foundations for a Covenantal Worldview (Two Age Press, 2000), 14-21, 91-117, 138-149.

-----, "Of Works and Grace" Presbyterion 9 (1983) 85-92.

Cornelis P. Venema, "Recent Criticisms of the 'Covenant of Works' in the Westminster Confession of Faith," Mid-America Journal of Theology 9 (1993) 165-198.

G.C. Berkouwer, Studies in Dogmatics: Sin (Eerdmans, 1971) 207ff.

Simon G. de Graaf, Promise and Deliverance volume 1 (Paedia Press, 1977).

Daniel Fuller, Gospel and Law: Contrast or Continuum? (Eerdmans, 1980).

-----, "A Response on the Subjects of Works and Grace," Presbuterion 9:1-2 (Spring-Fall 1983).

John Piper, Future Grace (Multnomah, 1998).

Norman Shepherd, The Call of Grace: How the Covenant Illuminates Salvation and Evangelism (Presbyterian and Reformed, 2000).

Clarence Stam, The Covenant of Love (Premier Publishing, 1999).

Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, ed. by E.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, 4/1 (T&T Clark, 1956) 22-66.

W. Wilson Benton, "Federal Theology: Review for Revision" in Through Christ's Word: A Festschrift for Philip E. Hughes ed. by W. Robert Godfrey, et al (Presbyterian and Reformed, 1985) 180-204.

Holmes Rolston, John Calvin Versus the Westminster Confession (John Knox Press, 1972).

James B. Torrance, "Calvin and Puritanism in England and Scotland: Some Basic Concepts in the Development of 'Federal Theology'" in Calvinus Reformator (Potchefstroom University Press, 1982).

-----, "Covenant or Contract? A study in the Theological Background of Worship in Seventeenth-Century Scotland" in Scottish Journal of Theology 23 (1970)

-----, "The Covenant Concept in Scottish Theology and Politics and its Legacy" in Scottish Journal of Theology 34 (1981) 225-43.

David Weir, The Origins of The Federal Theology in 16th Century Reformation Thought (Oxford 1990).

It is my sense that parties on both sides of current debates have sometimes been too quick to embrace the conclusions of this earlier scholarship, much of which has been roundly criticized by subsequent historical enquiry. In the case of some Klineans, it seems that the caricature of later federal theology provided by some Barthians has not only been accepted as accurate (while overlooking federalism's continuity with earlier thought), but also embraced as representing the best of classically Reformed theology. In the case of others, perhaps the reaction has been in the other direction, rejecting later federalist developments wholesale (while emphasizing their novelty), due perhaps to Barthian covenantal theology trickling down through influences such as Berkouwer.

Whatever the case, more recent historical scholarship has proven a helpful corrective to those who would set post-Reformation dogmatics against Calvin and the emerging Reformed tradition (see the list of "Further Resources," above). The historical picture is, in reality, far more complex and there are important continuities among early Reformed covenant theologians that are at least as important as any perceived discontinuities. What I am presenting here focuses more on the relevant continuities.

2. Barth's theology seems more properly called a kind of mono-covenantalism (coordinate with what some have termed his "christomonism"), than that of Shepherd or others (Herman Hoeksema, Klaas Schilder), in that Barth seems to allow grace to swallow up divine justice and law altogether to the point of virtually dispensing with the covenant of works altogether (similar tendencies are present, even if less pronounced, in T. F. Torrance and G. C. Berkouwer).

As for Kline, his denial that the term "grace" can be applied at all in the pre-lapsarian context is out of the mainstream, especially since he seems disinclined even towards the very concept, and not merely the term, "grace." Some Puritans wished to reserve the term "grace" for redemptive grace, but still allowed for "voluntary condescension," "favor," and so on. Kline appears to balk at such language. Along similar lines, Kline's insistence on Adamic "merit" is atypical of historic Reformed dogmatics which either denied merit altogether or only allowed for it in a significantly qualified way.

3. In his book The Ark of the Testament Opened, or, The Secret of the Lord's Covenant Unsealed in a Treatise of the Covenant of Grace (London, 1661), Patrick Gillespie (1617-1675) does make the distinction in the way I have above. He writes,

[1] Grace and Favour in God, and nothing in man, gave the rise to that Covenant, and to God's condescension to enter into it. [2] Grace in God which freely endued man with all the habits of grace in perfection, made him fitted and able to have kept that Covenant which God made with him, for his absolute Sovereign owed him no more than the rest of the creatures which he had made. [3] Grace engaged by promise, the reward that was promised to works of obedience by the Covenant, for there was no merit in Adam's obedience nor in ours (Luke 17:10)...nor did his work bear proportion to the eternal reward promised for it. (221)

4. Calvin had no hesitations about speaking of "grace" prior to the fall and apart from sin, speaking, for instance of the "grace which had been given to Adam" (in contrast to the greater grace given in Christ) in his 1547 Antidote to the Council of Trent. Much earlier, in the 1536 edition of the Institutes, he writes concerning the creation of humanity,

In order for us to come to a sure knowledge of ourselves, we must first grasp that Adam, parent of us all, was created in the image and likeness of God. That is, he was endowed with wisdom, righteousness, holiness, and was so clinging by these gifts of grace to God that he could have lived forever in Him, if he had stood fast in the uprightness God had given him. But when Adam slipped into sin, this image and likeness of God was cancelled and effaced, that is, he lost all the benefits of divine grace, by which he could have been led back into the way of life. (1.2; emphasis mine)

Let us assume for argument's sake that we were still in the integrity that our father Adam had at the beginning. Would we then presume that it was of our own doing, under the illusion that God has had given us the ability?....Would we have had it through our own skill? Would we have had it by our own power? No! But we would have it because God had given it to us by his own free goodness. (on Job 31:1-7)

Regarding the tragedy of humanity's fall into sin and the loss of grace involved, Calvin writes,

At that time, I say, when he had been raised to the highest degree of honour, Scripture attributed nothing else to him than that he was created in the image of God, thereby suggesting that man was blessed, not because his own actions, but by participation in God. What, therefore, remains for man, bare and destitute of all glory, but to acknowledge the God for whose kindness he failed to be grateful when he abounded with the riches of his grace? (1559 Institutes 2.2.1; emphasis mine)

5. John Ball was an Oxford educated clergyman and his A Treatise on the Covenant of Grace was published posthumously by Simeon Ash in June of 1645. It was prefaced with endorsements by five members of the Westminster Assembly itself (Anthony Burgess, Edmund Calamy, Daniel Cawdrey, Thomas Hill, and Edward Reynold), which went on for the next year to debate the doctrine of the covenant as it would appear in the Standards.

As Ball continues his exposition of the covenant of works, he writes,

The Author of this Covenant was God his Creator and Sovereign, who had bestowed many and great blessings upon man, furnished him with excellent abilities, and enriched him with singular privileges. This Covenant God made in Justice; yet so as it was of Grace likewise to make such a free promise, and to bestow so great things upon man for his obedience. God did in strict justice require obedience, promise a reward, and threaten punishment: but yet as bountiful and gracious unto his creature, entire and perfect, if he should so continue...God was pleased to manifest his goodness to man continuing in obedience, no less than his justice, as formerly in creation he had showed himself exceeding gracious to man, above other visible and corporal creatures.

6. Binning was, at one time, a professor of philosophy at the University of Glasgow, prior to being called to the ministry, serving the parish at Govan. The Common Principles of the Christian Religion was published posthumously in 1667. Earlier in that same treatise he writes, in Lecture II,

The end of our creation is communion and fellowship with God, therefore man was made with an immortal soul capable of it; and this is the greatest dignity and eminency of man above the creatures. He hath not only impressed from God's finger, in his first moulding, some characters resembling God, in righteousness and holiness; but is created with a capacity of receiving more of God by communion with him...There was an union made already in his first moulding; and communion was to grow as a fragrant and sweet fruit out of this blessed root. Union and similitude are the ground of fellowship and communion. That union was gracious,—that communion would have been glorious; for grace is the seed of glory.

7. Having been educated at several prominent Reformed institutions on the Continent, Turretin returned to Geneva where he remained a professor of theology from 1653 onward. While there he published his greatest work, Institutio theologiae elenctiae from 1679-1685. Regarding prelapsarian grace in general, he writes that Adam's "original righteousness can properly be called 'grace' or a 'gratuitous gift' (and so not due on the part of God, just as the nature itself also, created by him)" (Institutes 5.11.16).

Regarding the gratuitous promise of life held forth in the prelapsarian covenant of nature, Turretin argues that God promises not only bodily immortality, but also a transformed heavenly life. Had Adam persevered in obedience, the immortality of his body would only have been "through the dignity of original righteousness and the power of God's special grace" (5.12.9). Moreover, Adam's elevation to heavenly life would not have been a matter of mere justice, but also "the goodness of God" who is "plenteous in mercy" and by whom Adam would "be gifted" with heavenly life (8.6.6, 8).

For Turretin, not only was grace involved in Adam's creation, in God's promise, and in its reward, but Adam was also given "sufficient grace" by which to remain obedient to that first covenant, a grace that Turretin describes as "habitual and internal" (9.7.14-17).

8. James Fisher of Kinclaven was associated with the Marrow Men and was one of the founders of the Secession Church of Scotland along with the Erskines. Further on in his Catechism we find the following questions and answers:

Q. 34. Did the covenant of works oblige man to seek life upon the account of his obedience?

A. It left man to expect it upon his obedience, but did not oblige him to seek it on that score; but only on account of the faithfulness of God in his promise, graciously annexing life to man's sinless obedience, Matt. 19:16.

Q. 38. In what respect was it a covenant?

A. As it contained a promise of reward, graciously annexed to the precept, Gal. 3:12.

9. Archibald Alexander Hodge first published his book, A Commentary on the Confession of Faith: With Questions for Theological Students and Bible Classes, in 1869 (Presbyterian Board of Publication). His Outlines of Theology preceded it by nearly a decade, having been published in 1860. In it he writes of the covenant of works, "It was also essentially a gracious covenant, because although every creature is, as such, bound to serve the Creator to the full extent of his powers, the Creator cannot be bound as a mere matter of justice to grace the creature fellowship with himself." In his posthomously published Evangelical Theology: A Course of Popular Lectures (1890), Hodge similarly states, "God offered to man in this gracious Covenant of Works the opportunity of accepting his grace and receiving his covenant gift of a confirmed holy character" (167).

10. While I cannot fully document all the relevant Reformed theologians, this note includes an extensive cross-section, which, I hope, is representative of the wider tradition.

Zacharias Ursinus (1534-1583). While Ursinus' concept of a covenant with Adam is only nascent, according to his Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism 9 (Eerdmans, 1954), God created human beings in his own image with the "gifts" (gaben) of knowledge of himself, a desire to worship God wholly, and the ability to remain perfectly obedient. In the Latin parallel to this passage in his Catechesis Maior 210, he refers to these gifts as "grace" (gratia) and states that, in the fall, Adam and Eve "robbed themselves and all their descendents of that grace of God." The benefits enjoyed by humanity in Adam were not merely "good things" but also divine "grace" (Commentary 34) and that state of humanity was one in which we could not persevere apart from God's continued grace to us (Summa religiones christianae 154, 223).

William Bucanus

Franciscus Junius

Anthony Burgess

Patrick Gillespie

Thomas Blake

John Owen

Samuel Rutherford

William Bridge

Thomas Boston "I come now to shew why God entered into this covenant with man. I know no reason can be given for this, but what must be resolved into the glory of the grace and goodness of God. It was certainly an act of grace and admirable condescension in God, to enter into a covenant with his own creature...It must be owned, there was much grace in this transaction, in that God entered into terms of agreement with man, not his equal, but his own creature, and the work of his hands"

John Brown of Haddington

Thomas Ridgeley

J. H. Thornwell

Robert L. Dabney

Herman Bavinck.

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